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KICKING EMPLOYERS WHILE THEY ARE DOWN: 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER THE                              
ANTI-KICKBACK ACT 
Daniel Horner+ 
“‘Defense contractors cannot take advantage of the ongoing war effort by 
accepting unlawful kickbacks,’ said Tony West, Assistant Attorney General of 
the Civil Division of the United States Department of Justice.”1  Kickbacks are 
defined under federal law as any “thing of value or compensation of any kind 
that is provided to . . . improperly obtain or reward favorable treatment.”2  
Subcontractors often use kickbacks to obtain favor in the award of contracts by 
prime contractors.3  This conduct led to the creation of the National Procurement 
Fraud Task Force in 2006 to help eliminate the perceived corrupt practice of 
kickbacks in government procurement.4  The Task Force was comprised of many 
individuals, representing, inter alia, the United States Attorneys’ Office, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Inspectors General 
Office.5  Through the task force and other efforts, the U.S. Government has been 
successful in prosecuting numerous kickback schemes, ranging from fraudulent 
charges for non existent air shipments to Iraq to overcharged rent payments on 
shipping containers sent to Kuwait.6  Recently, the Government filed civil claims 
against contractors who allegedly inflated bills to the U.S. Government for work 
done by Kuwaiti companies, a contractor who subcontracted “to supply fuel 
tankers for more than triple the tankers’ value,” and a contractor who made lease 
payments “for trucks that had already been returned to the subcontractor.”7 
Historically, according to at least one source, the degree of procurement fraud 
in government contracting fluctuated with the level of defense spending in 
                                                            
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2012, Mount Saint Mary’s University.  I would like to thank Professor A.G. Harmon for his 
guidance and suggestions, the staff and editors of the Catholic University Law Review for their time 
and effort, and my family for their continued support throughout my time in law school. 
 1. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Intervenes in Suit 
Against KBR and Panalpina Alleging Kickbacks Under the False Claims Act (May 5, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/May/10-civ-529.html. 
 2. 41 U.S.C. § 8701(2) (2012). 
 3. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5962. 
 4. See Dep’t of Justice, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Greg Farrell, U.S. Sues Kellogg, Brown & Root Over Iraq Kickbacks Claims (1), 
BUSINESSWEEK.COM (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-01-23/u-dot-s-
dot-sues-kellogg-brown-and-root-over-claims-of-iraq-kickbacks. 
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America.8  In a typical scenario, after being awarded a contract, a prime 
contractor often subcontracts parts of the work.9  Subcontractors may be tempted 
to offer kickbacks to reward or to incentivize preferred treatment by the prime 
contractor.10  Such schemes date back to the Civil War, and reportedly spike 
coinciding  with defense spending during times of armed conflict.11  In 1946, 
Congress enacted the federal Anti-Kickback Act (“the Act” or “AKA”) in 
response to the perceived increase in kickbacks during World War II.12 
Congress strengthened the Anti-Kickback Act in 1986.13  The amended Act 
has reportedly been successful in helping the government recover money lost 
through procurement fraud.14  For the fiscal years 2005 and 2006, the 
Department of Justice reported that the United States recovered more than 4.5 
billion dollars in settlements and judgments from the pursuit of fraud, including 
an unspecified number of kickback cases.15 
The Anti-Kickback Act, as amended and codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 8701 et seq., 
imposes both criminal and civil liability on violators.16  The civil suit provision 
has two components.17  Subsection (a)(1) states that the government may recover 
double the amount of money involved from a violator of the Act who knowingly 
accepts a kickback, as well as an additional $10,000, or less, per occurrence.18  
Subsection (a)(2) states that, regardless of knowledge, any employer whose 
employee violates the Act is subject to a civil penalty equal to the amount of the 
kickback accepted.19 
                                                            
 8. See Sandy Keeney, The Foundations of Government Contracting, J. CONT. MGMT. 16–
18 (2007), http://www.ago.noaa.gov/acquisition/docs/Foundations_of_contracting_with_the_ 
federal_government.pdf.  “Between 2000 and 2005, procurement spending rose 86%, twice as fast 
as other discretionary spending, which rose 43%.  Indeed, federal contract expenditures now 
consume almost 40 cents of every dollar of discretionary spending.”  Gerald H. Lander et al., 
Government Procurement Fraud: Could SOX Be Used to Hold Contractors Accountable?, CPA J. 
(Feb. 2008), http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2008/208/infocus/p16.htm. 
 9. H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5962. 
 10. David W. Burgett, Vicarious Corporate Liability for Double Damages Under the AKA—
Fifth Circuit Opens the Door to Punishing the Employer When Its Employees Self-Deal, GOV’T 
CONTRACTOR (Thompson Reuters), Aug. 7, 2013, ¶ 240, at 1. 
 11. See Keeney, supra note 8, at 16–18. 
 12. See Margaret Schulenberger, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 
Federal Anti-Kickback Act (41 U.S.C.S. §§ 51–54), 19 A.L.R. 545, 548 (1974); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 99-964, at 3–4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5960 (“The bill . . . prohibit[s] the 
acceptance of a kickback, or the inclusion of its cost in a contract, as well as its payment.”). 
 13. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5960. 
 14. See Lander et al., supra note 8. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 8706–07 (2012). 
 17. Id. § 8706(a)(1)–(2). 
 18. Id. § 8706(a)(1). 
 19. See id. § 8706(a)(2). 
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A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.,20 potentially 
expanded the exposure of government contractors under the Anti-Kickback Act 
by introducing a theory of vicarious liability under subsection (a)(1), previously 
thought to be available only under subsection (a)(2).21  In Vavra, an employee 
of Kellogg Brown & Root accepted kickbacks on ninety-three occasions, which 
led to a qui tam22 action under the federal False Claims Act and the Anti-
Kickback Act.23  The government intervened and filed its own complaint, 
alleging that the defendant-employer was vicariously liable for its employee’s 
actions under subsection (a)(1), as well as strictly liable under subsection 
(a)(2).24  The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 
dismissed that component of the claim, holding that subsection (a)(1) did not 
create a cause of action for vicarious liability against employers.25 
The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that employers may be 
vicariously liable under (a)(1) for acts of employees.26  The imposition of 
vicarious liability substantially increases the government contractors’ potential 
exposure for acts of their employees, including acts unknown to and 
unauthorized by such contractors, because subsection (a)(1) provides for double 
damages.27  This ruling holds employers accountable twice for the same acts of 
their employees under both subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2).28  In addition, and even 
more troubling, the Fifth Circuit suggested that an employee may only need 
“apparent” authority to support a cause of action for vicarious liability.29  
Apparent authority has little to do with the actual authority of an employee and 
may be beyond the power of an employer to regulate.30  Moreover, the Fifth 
Circuit imposed neither a requirement that the employer have actual knowledge 
of the employee’s illegal conduct, nor a requirement that the employer receive 
                                                            
 20. 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 21. See id. at 352–53. 
 22. Qui tam actions are “action[s] brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue 
for a penalty, part of which the government or some specified public institution will receive.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 619 (9th ed. 2009). 
 23. Vavra, 727 F.3d at 345. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 343. 
 27. See Burgett, supra note 10, at 1 (stating that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Vavra “raise[d] 
the stakes for contractors who fail to monitor their employees . . . . [I]llustrat[ing] that contractors’ 
potential exposure is great”). 
 28. Vavra, 727 F.3d at 348. 
 29. See id. at 351–52. 
 30. See Charles Davant IV, Employer Liability for Employee Fraud: Apparent Authority or 
Respondeat Superior?, 47 S.D. L. REV. 554, 573 (2002) (“[A]pparent authority may apply even 
though no relationship exists between the principal and the apparent agent.”). 
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any benefit from the conduct, thereby increasing the likelihood that employers 
may be found liable under subsection (a)(1) in the absence of any fault.31 
This Note discusses why the majority and concurring opinions in Vavra were 
incorrect in concluding that employers should be vicariously liable under 
subsection (a)(1) of the civil penalty provision of the Anti-Kickback Act, 
without also requiring some form of knowledge or intent of the employee to 
benefit the employer.  The Note reviews the Anti-Kickback Act’s history and 
the development of the pertinent law.  Then, this Note discusses vicarious 
liability generally.  Next, this Note analyzes the Fifth Circuit’s decision to hold 
employers vicariously liable under section 8706(a)(1), despite the strict liability 
provision of subsection (a)(2), as well as the Court’s holding that an employee 
need only act with apparent authority to make the employer liable for his or her 
acts.  After discussing Vavra, and its imposition of liability on employers for 
employees’ actions, including actions of which the employers were unaware, 
this Note will explore the impact that the decision could have on government 
contracting.  To redress the unfortunate situation created by Vavra, this Note 
proposes an elevated standard—a showing of an employee’s intent to benefit the 
employer —to justify imputing employees’ knowledge to employers for 
vicarious liability purposes. 
I.  THE ANTI-KICKBACK ACT’S FORMATION AND EARLY CASES 
A.  The Anti-Kickback Act 
Kickbacks exist as “a form of commercial bribery.”32 Specifically, kickbacks 
are defined as: 
[A]ny money, fee, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing of value, or 
compensation of any kind that is provided to a prime contractor, prime 
contractor employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee to 
improperly obtain or reward favorable treatment in connection with a 
prime contract or a subcontract relating to a prime contract.33 
The Act forbids any person or business from “[p]roviding[,] . . . accepting, or 
attempting to accept any kickback; and . . . including . . . the amount of any 
prohibited kickback in the price charged by a subcontractor to a prime contractor 
or higher-tier subcontractor, or in the price charged by the prime contractor to 
the government.”34 
                                                            
 31. See Vavra, 727 F.3d, at 350 (disagreeing with KBR’s arguments that there should be an 
“intent-to-benefit requirement” and knowledge standard). 
 32. H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5962. (“Bribes 
made to employees of a company with a contractual relationship to the government (either directly 
as a prime contractor, or indirectly as a subcontractor) are termed kickback and governed by the 
Anti-Kickback Act . . . .”). 
 33. 41 U.S.C. § 8701(2) (2012). 
 34. STEVEN FELDMAN & W. NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL 35 
(5th ed. 2011). 
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The government found kickbacks were prevalent during World War II, 
leading to the passage of the first version of the Act.35  The costs of such 
kickbacks were built into subcontract prices and passed through the prime 
contract to the government.36  The Act attempted to control the practice, 
preventing the expense from ultimately falling on the taxpayer.37  Although it is 
difficult to determine the government’s actual contract damages from a kickback 
scheme, the harm may often be significant.38  The government also incurs costs 
for investigating and prosecuting these schemes.39 
1.  The 1986 Amendments to the AKA 
Prior to 1986, the Anti-Kickback Act was characterized as an “extraordinarily 
ambiguous statute” because of the wording of the statute, “an inconclusive 
legislative history,” and a lack of definitive precedent.40  Congress amended the 
AKA in 1986 to make it more effective in preventing and punishing government 
contractors’ kickback practices.41  According to the House Committee on 
Government Operations, kickbacks “ha[d] become a pervasive problem in 
Federal procurement.”42  The Committee found that the taxpayers bore the 
burden of the kickback because the cost was built into the subcontract price and 
included in the prime contract to the government.43  Consequently, the kickbacks 
burdened the taxpayers.44 
                                                            
 35. See Shulenberger, supra note 12, at 548–49 (explaining that the General Accounting 
Office began discovering kickbacks while auditing “cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts” during World 
War II). 
 36. See id.  See also United States v. Acme Process Equip. Co., 385 U.S. 138, 143 (1967) 
(explaining how the cost of kickbacks are passed on to the government). 
 37. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5962 (“In most cases, 
the kickback cost is included in the subcontract price and passed along in the prime contract to the 
government and, therefore, ultimately to the taxpayer.”). 
 38. See United States v. Kruse, 101 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 (E.D. Va. 2000) (citing United States 
v. Lippert, 148 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 1998)).  “[T]he government must incur additional 
investigative and enforcement costs to ferret out and stop . . . abusive schemes,” and “Congress 
stated that it established the penalty as ‘an amount which reasonably relates to the actual costs the 
government suffers when kickbacks occur.’”  Id. (quoting Lippert, 148 F.3d at 977). 
 39. Id. 
 40. United States v. Perry, 431 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 41. United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 473, 490 
(E.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The AKA was amended in 1986 ‘to enhance 
the government’s ability to prevent and prosecute kickback practices’ in connection with contracts 
of the federal government.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 5961)). 
 42. H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5961. 
 43. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5962. 
 44. Id. 
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By 1986, the problem was so widespread that a senator described it as 
“nationwide” and “well-entrenched.”45  Congress perceived the AKA’s existing 
criminal and civil penalties as insufficient to deter misconduct.46  Furthermore, 
the Act was limited in the scope of what it could punish.47  In response, Congress 
broadened, strengthened, and clarified the Act by “rais[ing] the civil penalties, 
for knowing violations, to twice the amount of the kickback involved and up to 
$10,000 in fines.”48  Additionally, Congress’ amendments imposed “vicarious 
civil liability, without regard to fault, on the Federal prime contractor and all 
higher tier subcontractors for any kickbacks made by their subcontractors,” for 
the amount of the kickback.49 
2.  The Courts’ Interpretation of the AKA 
i.  Defining “Knowingly” 
The AKA does not define the term “knowingly,”50 and few cases have 
analyzed this element, especially since the 1986 amendments.51  The term 
“knowingly” generally requires a showing that the defendant was aware of the 
facts constituting the offense, but not “proof that [the defendant] knew his acts 
violated the law.”52  When the Act was amended, Senator Levin, the Chairman 
and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 
                                                            
 45. Id. at 6, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5963 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Additionally, Congressman John Bryant testified that “despite the pervasiveness of kickback 
activity in Federal government subcontracting, there have been only eight convictions under [the] 
Anti-Kickback Act during the past five years.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 46. Id. at 8 (“The provisions of the Anti-Kickback Act are too narrow in scope and its 
sanctions too weak, for the Act to be effectively used in deterring and prosecuting kickback 
practices.”). 
 47. See id. at 8–9. 
The first and foremost limitation on enforcement of the Act is the requirement that the 
payment of a kickback be made to induce the award of a subcontract or order, or as an 
acknowledgement of a subcontract order previously awarded . . . . A second major 
limitation in the Act is its restriction to kickbacks made in relation to negotiated contracts. 
Id. 
 48. Id. at 10. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 8701, 8706 (2012).  The civil suit provision of the AKA now reads: 
The Federal Government in a civil action may recover from a person—(1) that knowingly 
engages in conduct prohibited by section 8702 of this title a civil penalty equal to—(A) 
twice the amount of each kickback involved in the violation; and (B) not more than 
$10,000 for each occurrence of prohibited conduct; and (2) whose employee, 
subcontractor, or subcontractor employee violates section 8702 of this title by providing, 
accepting, or charging a kickback a civil penalty equal to the amount of that kickback. 
Id. § 8706(a). 
 51. See 3 KAREN L. MANOS, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS COSTS & PRICING, § 91.24 (2d ed. 
2014). 
 52. See id. (“However, the Supreme Court has construed the mens rea term ‘willfully’ to 
require proof that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated a ‘known legal duty.’”). 
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Management of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, stated, “[t]he 
knowing . . . standard requires the Government to prove that the alleged 
wrongdoer knew what he or she was doing and was not acting through mistake, 
inadvertence or mere negligence.”53 
One way to attempt to discern Congress’ intended interpretation of the AKA’s 
language is to analyze the meaning of the same terms in similar statutes.  Both 
the federal False Claims Act (FCA)54 and federal Medicare Anti-Kickback 
Statute (AKS)55 contain the word “knowingly.”56  Under the FCA, “knowingly” 
is defined as having actual knowledge,57 deliberate ignorance, or reckless 
disregard.58  In the AKS, the standard required is “knowingly and willfully,” a 
higher bar than the “knowingly” standard in the FCA.59 
These terms have been well defined by case law.60  At the least, these statutes 
have used “knowingly” to describe a showing of a reckless failure to learn the 
                                                            
 53. 132 Cong. Rec. 31,239, 31,299 (1986) (statement of Sen. Levin). 
 54. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012). 
 56. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (imposing, in the FCA, liability on anyone who “knowingly 
presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320a-7b(b) (outlining, in the AKS, criminal penalties for a person who “knowingly and willfully 
solicits or receives any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate)”). 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. Advance Tool Co., 902 F. Supp. 1011, 1016 (D. Mo. 1995), 
aff’d, 86 F.3d 1159 (8th Cir. 1996) (presenting invoices for tools that were reverse engineered to 
satisfy contract with government constituted actual knowledge).   “[A]ctual knowledge . . . may be 
demonstrated through circumstantial evidence.”  CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: 
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT § 4:37 (2d ed. 2014).  See United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 
F.2d 1003, 1008 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the failure to disclose information may indicate actual 
knowledge of falsity). 
 58. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729.  Deliberate ignorance and reckless disregard are generally 
considered together.  See SYLVIA, supra note 57, § 4:38.  The U.S. Senate described the standard 
as a “refusal to learn of information which an individual, in the exercise of prudent judgment, had 
reason to know.”  S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 15 (1986).  See United States ex rel. Farmer v. City of 
Hous., 523 F.3d 333, 348 (5th Cir. 2008) (deciding reckless disregard under the FCA applies to 
government contractors who claim that they were unaware of overcharges); United States v. Krizek, 
111 F.3d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (describing reckless disregard as extreme gross negligence); 
United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 2d 40, 55 (D.D.C. 2008) (explaining 
reckless disregard is as “an extension of gross negligence, or gross-negligence-plus, and is not 
merely a proxy for subjective intent”); UMC Elec. Co. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 776, 792 n.15 
(1999), aff’d, 249 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (describing reckless disregard as “gross negligence-
plus” (quoting United States ex rel. Aakhus v. Dyncorp, Inc., 136 F.3d 676, 682 (1998) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 59. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (“Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or receives 
any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or 
covertly, in cash or in kind [is guilty of a felony].”), with 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (allowing actual 
knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard to prove a violation of the FCA).  The AKS 
covers any agreement “where one purpose of the remuneration was to obtain money for the referral 
of services or to induce further referrals.”  United States ex rel. Westmoreland v. Amgen, Inc., 812 
F. Supp. 2d 39, 47 (D. Mass. 2011) (citing United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir.1989); 
United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69 (3d Cir.1985)). 
 60. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
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truth about an arrangement.61  These definitions of “knowingly” shed light on 
the definition of the term in the AKA, and suggest that a level of culpability 
beyond mere mistake or negligence, as proposed by Senator Levin, is needed to 
prove a violation.62 
ii.  Damages Under the AKA 
The damages outlined in the Anti-Kickback Act are both remedial and 
punitive, with civil damages aimed at recovering the costs of the kickback borne 
by the taxpayer.63  However, “the [AKA] calls the recovery a ‘penalty’ and it 
permits a per occurrence penalty, which resembles a punitive fine.”64  A review 
of the legislative history revealed that Congress intended to create both remedial 
damages, aimed to compensate the government for expenses, and punitive 
damages, meant to deter kickback practices.65  Even in the face of Eighth 
Amendment challenges that the punitive damages are excessive, the courts have 
been willing to uphold their use.66 
                                                            
 61. See, e.g., Farmer, 523 F.3d at 348. 
 62. 132 Cong. Rec. 31,239, 31,299 (1986) (statement of Sen. Levin). 
 63. See United States v. Kruse, 101 F. Supp. 2d 410, 413 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“The [AKA] itself 
manifests both remedial and punitive intent. With its emphasis on the civil nature of this recovery, 
the statute appears to establish remedial damages.”). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 413–14.  The Act penalizes for “an amount which reasonably relates to the actual 
costs the government suffers when kickbacks occur.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  Kickbacks 
usually cost the government more than the amount of the kickback itself, through “increased costs 
from the delivery of substandard goods or by poor performance under the contract,” as well as the 
“expenses [of] investigating and prosecuting kickback cases.”  H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 15 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5972.  Consequently, “[d]oubling the kickback payment 
compensates [the government] for these greater costs.”  Id.  By allowing for an added recovery 
under the Act of up to $10,000, the court can exercise its discretion to provide greater damages for 
grievous offenses.  Id.  When the kickback itself is an insignificant amount, this added penalty can 
serve as a deterrent.  Id.  The Committee believed that the additional damages were reasonable to 
help the government recover from the harm suffered and to discourage the use of kickbacks.  See 
id. 
 66. Kruse, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 414 (“Even if the Eighth Amendment is triggered by the Anti-
Kickback statute, the penalties as applied in this case are not unconstitutionally excessive with 
respect to either the gravity of the offense or the damages suffered by the government.”)  In Kruse, 
the defendants argued that the kickbacks at issue “came out of the profits paid to the government 
contractor and that the government would have paid the same amount for the contract whether there 
had been kickbacks or not.”  Id. at 415.  Applying a rational basis standard and examining the 
legislative history, the court held that the Act was related to the government’s purpose of preventing 
kickbacks, and found a “rational relationship between the amount of losses and the amount sought.”  
Id.  The court also found that the Act did not violate the Fifth Amendment, stating that, 
“[p]rocedurally, Kruse has had several opportunities to contest the amount of the kickbacks . . . 
Accordingly, the Court f[ound] that the Anti-Kickback statute does not violate the defendants’ Fifth 
Amendment right to due process.”  Id. 
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B.  Vicarious Liability 
To understand the Fifth Circuit’s questionable interpretation of subsection 
(a)(1), a review of vicarious liability is necessary.  Vicarious liability, simply 
stated, is liability for another person’s tort.67  Most commonly, vicarious liability 
occurs in an employer-employee relationship, also known as respondeat 
superior.68  This doctrine holds employers jointly liable, alongside the tortfeasor, 
and severally liable, or individually responsible, for any torts that occurred while 
the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment.69  In some 
cases, the employee can serve as an agent of the employer, and bind the 
employer to his or her actions.70  In government contracting, this occurs when 
the employee of a prime contractor contracts with a subcontractor. 
Generally, an employee’s actions are not considered within the scope of 
employment unless the actions were specifically authorized or expected by the 
employer.71  Therefore, the level of authority, and the scope of that authority, 
                                                            
 67. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 333, at 905 (2000).  This exception to the 
notion that each person is accountable for his or her own actions is important for the recovery of 
victims and outweighs the effect of punishing a person for actions in which he or she has no legal 
fault.  See id. 
 68. Id.  “The most common kind of vicarious liability is based upon the principle of 
respondeat superior.  Under that principle, private and public employers are generally jointly and 
severally liable along with the tortfeasor employee for the torts of employees committed within the 
scope of employment.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  Some scholars have doubted whether respondeat 
superior can be justified as a doctrine because it goes against common sense to punish one man for 
another’s wrongdoing.  Id. § 334, at 908 (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, II, 5 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 14 (1891)).  Others have criticized the doctrine as a method of reaching deeper pockets 
than those of the person who committed the harmful action.  Id. (citing T. BATY, VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY 154 (1916)).  Dobbs argued that courts have provided safeguards requiring a showing 
of either formal control over the employee by the employer, or that the employer benefits from the 
employee’s work.  See id. § 335, at 910.  These safeguards, along with the selective application of 
vicarious liability to tort law, protect employers from any potential abuse of the doctrine.  Id.  
Selective applications means that “[w]hen the tort becomes uncharacteristic of the business, 
liability is not imposed.  Legal analysis of this idea is expressed as the rule that the master is liable 
for the torts of his servants only if those torts are committed within the scope of the servant’s 
employment.”  Id. 
 69. Id. § 333, at 905. 
 70. See id.   
 71. Id. § 335, at 910.  “Under the traditional rules, a servant’s conduct is not within the scope 
of his employment unless it is of the same general kind as authorized or expected, or incidental to 
such conduct, and the servant was acting within the authorized time and space limits.”  Id.  Some 
jurisdictions require that the agent’s conduct have the purpose to serve the principal in order to be 
considered within the scope of his employment.  See id.; see, e.g., Papa John’s Int’l, Inc. v. McCoy, 
244 S.W.3d 44, 52 (Ky. 2008) (holding that the proper way to determine scope of employment is 
to focus on the employee’s intent to further the employer’s business).  Other courts have expressly 
rejected this test for scope of employment.  See, e.g., Melin-Schilling v. Imm, 205 P.3d 905, 907–
09 (Wash. App. 2009) (stating that the scope of employment should be determined by examining 
whether the employer should have foreseen the tortious conduct given the duties imposed by the 
job itself). 
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held by an employee is crucial to determining whether imposition of vicarious 
liability is appropriate.72 
1.  Actual and Apparent Authority 
As the Restatement (Third) of Agency states, an agent possesses actual 
authority when the agent acts with the express direction of the principal.73  
Actual authority may also refer to implied authority, which is the authority to do 
anything: 
necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform an agent’s 
express responsibilities or . . . to act in a manner in which an agent 
believes the principal wishes the agent to act based on the agent’s 
reasonable interpretation of the principal’s manifestation in light of the 
principal’s objectives and other facts known to the agent.74 
The agent’s interpretation is reasonable if it reflects the principal’s express 
wishes or if, in the absence of clear directions, a reasonable person in the agent’s 
position would interpret the principal’s wishes in that manner.75 
In some instances an agent acts without actual authority, but is said to have 
apparent authority.76  According to the authors of the Restatement (Third) of 
Agency, “[a]pparent authority holds a principal accountable for the results of 
third-party beliefs about an actor’s authority to act as an agent when the belief 
is reasonable and is traceable to a manifestation of the principal.”77  Because it 
is difficult for a third party to distinguish between an agent’s actual and apparent 
authority, apparent authority “trumps restrictions that the principal has privately 
imposed on the agent.”78  In order for a third party to establish apparent 
authority, it is not necessary to find any fault on the part of the principal, but 
only for the third party to show that the representations of the agent under the 
circumstances make it fair to impose liability on the principal.79  In such cases, 
                                                            
 72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006). 
 73. See id.  “Express authority” is a phrase used alongside actual authority to describe 
“authority that a principal has stated in very specific or detailed language.”  Id. § 2.01 cmt. b.  
Essential to “determining whether an agent acted with actual authority is the agent’s reasonable 
understanding at the time the agent takes action.”  Id. § 2.01 cmt. c.  The principal’s initial grant of 
authority may be modified during the course of performance either through subsequent 
manifestations or developments that the agent reasonably takes into consideration when 
determining the principal’s wishes.  Id. 
 74. Id. § 2.01 cmt. b. 
 75. See id. § 2.02(2). 
 76. Id. § 2.03. 
 77. Id. § 2.03 cmt. c. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. § 2.03 cmt. e; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1958).  
“[A]pparent authority usually refers to a situation where an employer puts an employee, who lacks 
actual authority, in a situation that makes it inequitable for the employer to deny relief to a third 
party who reasonably relies on the acts of the employee.”  John S. Pachter, Fifth Circuit Holds 
Contractors Subject to Vicarious Liability for Employees Engaged in Kickbacks, SMITH PACHTER 
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the employer may be held vicariously liable for the acts of its agents.80  However, 
some jurisdictions have sought to limit the use of vicarious liability for the 
imposition of damages on principals in certain circumstances.81 
2.  Limiting Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages 
Disagreement exists between jurisdictions “over whether and how to limit 
vicarious liability for punitive damages.”82  The Restatement (Second) of Agency 
states that punitive damages can only be awarded if the employee was acting in 
the scope of his or her employment.83  In contrast, the Restatement (Third) of 
Agency proposes that an employee’s conduct be intended to benefit the employer 
in some way before vicarious liability may attach.84 
When determining whether vicarious liability applies in cases involving 
punitive damages “the court should review the type of authority that the 
employer has given to the employee, the amount of discretion that the employee 
has in what is done and how it is accomplished.”85  However, the Supreme Court 
has stated that these Restatement rules do not apply to special statutes, such as 
antitrust laws, which are designed to deter future violations and compensate 
victims.86  The Supreme Court also specified that to hold employers vicariously 
liable, the employee should be in the upper hierarchy of the company, but not 
necessarily the top management, officers, or directors.87 
                                                            
MCWHORTER PLC (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.smithpachter.com/post-detail.php?id=10152.  See 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt. b (apparent authority doctrine is based on the 
reasonable expectations of a third party).  “Apparent authority . . . is operative in explaining a 
principal’s vicarious liability when a third party’s reasonable belief in an agent’s authority to speak 
or deal on behalf of a principal stems from a manifestation made by the principal . . . .”  Id. 
 80. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 35:11, at 289–91 
(Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2007).  If an injury would not have occurred but for the third party’s 
reliance on the apparent authority of the agent, it is well-settled that tort liability exists.  Id. 
 81. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 82. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 542 (1999). 
 83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 C. 
 84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2) (“An employee’s act is not within the 
scope of employment when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not intended by the 
employee to serve any purpose of the employer.”).  See e.g., Crouch v. J.C. Penney Corp., Inc., 562 
F. Supp. 2d 833, 842 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (holding that statements made with intent to improve the 
workplace are attributable to the employer due to the advancement of the employer’s purpose). 
 85. LINDA SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 4.4(B)(2)(a), at 186 
(4th ed. 2000). 
 86. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575–76 (1982) 
(“Since treble damages serve as a means of deterring antitrust violations and of compensating 
victims, it is in accord with both the purposes of the antitrust laws and principles of agency law to 
hold [a party] liable for the acts of agents committed with apparent authority.”) 
 87. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 543 (holding that employer could not be liable for punitive damages 
for the discriminatory employment actions of managerial agents where the decisions were contrary 
to the good faith efforts of the employer to comply with Title VII). 
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Vicarious liability has been applied to causes of action under the FCA in 
contexts similar to those under the AKA.88  In one FCA action, the court stated 
that when the employee: 
use[s] his knowledge and position of trust to take from the government 
and the employer. . . . the “scope of the employment” test . . . is 
excessively punitive to corporations victimized by the criminal acts of 
their employees.  Rather, the addition of requiring the government to 
prove that the actions were for the purpose of benefitting the 
corporation ensures that the FCA is not merely an effective weapon 
against government fraud, but a just one as well.89 
FCA actions are often litigated in conjunction with AKA actions, and it follows 
that the statutes should be interpreted similarly.90  However, in Vavra, the Fifth 
Circuit distinguished the AKA from the FCA, and held that the FCA’s elevated 
standard was not applicable.91 
III.  U.S. EX REL. VAVRA V. KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT, INC.: THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT IMPOSES VICARIOUS LIABILITY ON EMPLOYERS UNDER            
SUBSECTION (A)(1) 
In 2001, Kellogg Brown and Root, Inc. (“KBR”)92 contracted with the United 
States Army “to provide global logistical services . . . [under the] Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program III.”93  This contract allowed the Army to issue tasks to 
KBR on an on-going basis.94  KBR subcontracted some of its work to two 
companies—EGL, Inc. and Panalpina, Inc.—to transport military equipment 
and supplies to the Middle East.95 
                                                            
 88. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 19 F.3d 770, 777 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding 
that action under the AKA does not preempt action under the False Claims Act or federal common 
law). 
 89. United States ex rel. Baker v. Rehab. Specialists of Livingston Cnty, Inc., No. 00-74410, 
2008 WL 3834106, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2008). 
 90. See, e.g., Morse Diesel Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 116, 117, 121–22 (holding 
a government contractor liable for maximum penalties and damages under both the AKA and the 
FCA). 
 91. See United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 353 (5th 
Cir. 2013). 
 92. KBR is an engineering, procurement, and construction company that works heavily in 
energy, petrochemicals, government services, and civil infrastructure projects.  Company Profile, 
KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT, http://www.kbr.com/About/Company-Profile/ (last visited Oct. 11, 
2013).  The company employs approximately 27,000 people spread throughout seventy countries 
across five continents.  Id.  KBR separated from Halliburton in 2006 and became publicly traded 
on the New York Stock Exchange.  History, KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT, http://www.kbr.com/ 
about/history/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2013). 
 93. Vavra, 727 F.3d at 344–45. 
 94. Id. at 345 
 95. Id. 
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During the course of the contract, KBR’s Corporate Traffic Supervisor, 
Robert Bennett, along with others in the transportation department, accepted 
kickbacks from subcontractors, offered to make up for service failures on behalf 
of the subcontractors, and ensured that the subcontractors continued to receive 
work despite poor performance.96  These kickbacks included barbecues, meals 
and drinks, golf outings, tickets to rodeo events, baseball games, football games, 
and other sporting events.97  Bennett and the subcontractor who provided the 
kickbacks pleaded guilty under the criminal provision of the AKA.98 
Two relators,99 David Vavra and Jerry Hyatt, brought a qui tam100 suit against 
KBR, the employee who accepted the kickbacks, and the subcontractors who 
provided them under the FCA.101  The government intervened, as allowed under 
the FCA, filed its own complaint in the matter replacing the relators’ claim, and 
also brought a claim under 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1) of the AKA.102  KBR filed a 
12(b) motion to dismiss the government’s AKA claim, arguing that (a)(1) did 
not provide for vicarious liability, and, furthermore, that because the employee 
who accepted kickbacks was not acting to benefit the corporation, vicarious 
liability would not be appropriate even if (a)(1) allowed for it.103 
A.  The District Court Decision 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted 
KBR’s motion to dismiss the AKA claim, finding that the statute did not provide 
for vicarious liability under subsection (a)(1).104  The court examined subsection 
(a)(2), which states that “[t]he Federal Government in a civil action may recover 
from a person . . . whose employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee 
violates section 8702 of this title by providing, accepting, or charging a kickback 
a civil penalty equal to the amount of that kickback.”105  In undertaking its 
statutory interpretation, the court sought “‘to give each word . . . [its] operative 
                                                            
 96. See id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Defendant Kellogg Brown & Root, 
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of the United States of America, at 7, United States ex rel. 
Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 473, 482 (E.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d and 
remanded, 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 1:04-cv-00042-MAC). 
 99. A relator is the name of a plaintiff who brings a qui tam action and files a public lawsuit 
on behalf of the government.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1292 (9th ed. 2009). 
 100. A qui tam action is one in which “a statute . . . allows a private person to sue for a penalty, 
part of which the government or some specified public institution will receive.”  Id. at 1262.  The 
qui tam action in this case was initiated under the FCA.  Vavra, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 478–79.  The 
government intervened and brought the AKA action against KBR alongside the FCA claim.  Id. 
 101. Vavra, 727 F.3d at 345. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Vavra, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 479. 
 104. Id. at 488. 
 105. 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(2) (2012); Vavra, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 490. 
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effect’ and to render none superfluous.”106  Subsection (a)(2) provides for strict 
liability any time an employee commits a violation of the Act.107  The court held 
that subsection (a)(1), which states “[t]he Federal Government in a civil action 
may recover from a person . . . that knowingly engages in conduct prohibited by 
[the Act],”108 would render subsection (a)(2) superfluous if vicarious liability 
also existed under subsection (a)(1).109  To support its interpretation, the court 
examined the legislative history of the Act.110 
Moreover, the district court held that dismissal was appropriate because the 
government had not alleged in its complaint that the KBR employees who 
accepted kickbacks did so with the intent to benefit their employer.111  Central 
to this assertion was the court’s interpretation of two Fifth Circuit decisions: 
United States v. Hangar One, Inc.,112 and United States v. Ridglea State Bank.113  
Hangar One involved the employee of a defense contractor who knowingly 
submitted defective artillery shells to the government.114  Ridglea involved two 
banks and a loan officer who fraudulently approved loan applications in the 
course of his employment.115  In both of these cases, the Fifth Circuit held that 
knowledge of an employee acting in violation of the law would not be imputed 
to the employer unless the employee acted to benefit the employer.116 
B.  Vavra On Appeal: The Fifth Circuit’s Current Opinion on the AKA’s 
Vicarious Liability 
In reversing the district court’s decision, the Fifth Circuit first analyzed the 
definition of “person” as it appears in 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1).117  The court noted 
that the Act “defines ‘person’ to include both an ‘individual’ and ‘a corporation, 
                                                            
 106. Vavra, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (quoting United States v. Vargas-Duran, 356 F.3d 598, 603 
(5th Cir. 2004)). 
 107. See 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(2). 
 108. Id. § 8706(a)(1). 
 109. Vavra, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 490–91. 
 110. Id. at 491.  The court reasoned that “[p]rior to the AKA’s amendment in 1986, the statute 
authorized a penalty only against subcontractors and individual recipients of kickbacks, rather than 
prime contractors.”  Id.  According to the court, “[t]he statute’s amendment, in part, was designed 
to enable the government to sue a prime contractor or a ‘higher tier subcontractor’ for a ‘lower tier 
subcontractor’s’ AKA violation under a theory of vicarious liability.”  Id.  However, the court also 
stated that “[t]he penalty for such vicarious liability is expressly limited to the amount of the 
kickback.”  Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. 563 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[L]iability of a corporation for a False Claims Act 
violation may arise from the conduct of employees other than those with ‘substantial authority and 
broad responsibility.’”). 
 113. 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966), superseded by statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
 114. Hangar One, 563 F.2d at 1157. 
 115. Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 496. 
 116. See Hangar One, 563 F.2d at 1158; Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 499–500. 
 117. United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 346–47 (5th 
Cir. 2013). 
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partnership, business association of any kind, trust, [and] joint-stock 
company.’”118  Consequently, the court defined KBR as a person under 
subsection (a)(1).119  The court then turned to a textual and structural analysis of 
41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1) to determine whether it provides for vicarious liability.120 
Ultimately, the court disagreed with the district court’s reading, which limited 
employers’ responsibility for their employees to damages under subsection 
(a)(2).121  The majority, considering the broad definition of the term “person,” 
held that “[s]ince [s]ection [(a)(1)] makes corporations liable for kickback 
activity, it requires attributing liability to corporate entities for that activity under 
a rule of vicarious liability.”122  The court did not believe that its decision 
rendered subsection (a)(2) superfluous, and opined that the difference between 
the subsections was the punishment of a “knowing” violation under subsection 
(a)(1) versus the strict civil penalty under subsection (a)(2).123  The majority 
declined to define “knowingly” as it appears in (a)(1), instead, stating that the 
determination of a knowing violation was a “nuanced, fact-reliant question 
[under the AKA] unsuited for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.”124  The 
court cited to its decision in Hangar One, which held that under FCA, “liability 
of a corporation . . . may arise from the conduct of employees other than those 
with substantial authority and broad responsibility.”125 
The appellate court also disagreed with KBR’s second argument—that 
heightened pleading standards should be applied if vicarious liability is available 
under (a)(1) and that the government’s complaint did not meet that standard.126  
Instead, the Fifth Circuit suggested that an employer is responsible for an 
employee’s acts when they are performed within the scope of his or her 
employment, when an employee acted with apparent authority, or when an 
employee’s knowledge can be imputed to the employer because of the rank he 
or she holds within the company.127 
The majority distinguished this case from its decision in Ridglea, where the 
Fifth Circuit held that knowledge of an employee acting in violation of the law 
would not be imputed to the employer unless the employee acted to benefit the 
employer.128  KBR sought to have the Ridglea standard extended to its case but 
                                                            
 118. Id. (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 8701(3) (2012)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 348. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 349. 
 125. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Hangar One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
 126. See id. at 350. 
 127. Id. 350–53. 
 128. Vavra, 727 F.3d at 352.  This argument is similar to the adverse interest exception that is 
invoked when the agent’s interests and the principal’s interests are at odds.  See Martin Marietta 
Corp. v. Gould, Inc., 70 F.3d 768, 773 (4th Cir. 1995).  In these circumstances, the agent’s 
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the court refused, holding that 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1) was “meaningfully 
distinct” from the provisions of the FCA that the court analyzed in Ridglea.129  
In the majority’s opinion, the distinction between the two acts was the type of 
damages—damages under the AKA are compensatory, whereas the damages 
under the FCA are punitive.130  However, the Fifth Circuit determined, with little 
elaboration, that 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1)’s damages were solely compensatory.131 
To further justify its reasoning for not extending the holding in Ridglea,132 the 
court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. (ASME).133  In ASME, the Court 
stated that “under general rules of agency law, principals are liable when their 
agents act with apparent authority” even when “the agent acts solely to benefit 
himself.”134 
C.  The Vavra Concurring Opinion: A Focus on Statutory Analysis 
Judge Jolly, in his concurring opinion, criticized the majority’s statutory 
analysis and considered the broader context in which the term “person” was used 
in 41 U.S.C. § 8706.135  While the majority turned to the statute’s definition 
section to conclude that “person” includes both individuals and corporations, 
Judge Jolly found it necessary to analyze the term “person” as it was modified 
in the statute under subsection (a)(1) by the word “knowingly.”136  Judge Jolly 
noted that “when a corporation is being sued, the corporation (i.e. the person) 
itself must have knowledge of the kickback before liability may arise.”137 
For corporations, the knowledge of higher-level employees is “imputable to 
the corporation.”138  Judge Jolly concluded that, in cases where acts of officers 
or directors of a company led to suit under the AKA, the punishment would be 
direct liability as opposed to vicarious liability.139  Under Judge Jolly’s 
reasoning, vicarious liability would be reserved for circumstances under 
                                                            
knowledge should not be imputed to the principal.  See id. (explaining that knowledge is not 
imputed when an agent acts outside the scope of his employment and when the employer and 
employee interest are adverse because the employee will probably not perform his proper duty or 
tell the employer what he is doing). 
 129. Vavra, 727 F.3d at 352. 
 130. See id. at 351–52. 
 131. See id. at 353. 
 132. See id. at 350.  “We have elaborated little on the holding in Ridglea nor have we applied 
it to any other civil statute.  In Ridglea itself, we acknowledged the outcome was in tension with 
precedent generally construing FCA double damages and forfeiture provisions.”  Id. (footnote 
omitted). 
 133. 456 U.S. 556 (1982); Vavra, 727 F.3d at 350–51. 
 134. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp. (ASME), 456 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1982). 
 135. Vavra, 727 F.3d at 354 (Jolly, J., concurring). 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 354–55. 
 139. Id. 
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subsection (a)(1) when knowledge of the employee is imputable—a highly fact-
intensive question.140 
Judge Jolly opined that vicarious liability under subsection (a)(1) was 
consistent with the purpose of the statute because it punished knowing violations, 
which was distinct from violations creating strict liability under subsection 
(a)(2).141  He agreed with the majority that knowing violations deserved harsher 
punishments, but only in instances where the knowledge of the employee was 
clearly imputable.142  Subsequently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit endorsed Judge Jolly’s arguments in a similar case also involving 
KBR.143 
D.  The Federal Circuit Weighs In 
In Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States,144 another AKA 
action against KBR, the United States Court of Federal Claims found that a 
corporation could be vicariously liable under both subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2); 
however, the particular KBR employees who accepted kickbacks were not 
senior enough to trigger vicarious liability.145  On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
overturned the lower court’s decision, holding, in accordance with the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision, that the employee’s knowledge was imputable when the 
employee acted with apparent authority.146 
The Federal Circuit noted that the difference between the two subsections was 
the degree of knowledge required, and, while acknowledging that there was 
confusion in the wording, the legislative history made it clear that subsection 
(a)(1) was intended to impose vicarious liability.147  The court then addressed 
under what circumstances it would be appropriate for imputing knowledge to 
the corporation, pursuant to subsection (a)(1).148 
The court stated that an agent’s knowledge is imputed to the principal in cases 
where the employee acts within the scope of his or her employment, but noted 
that courts have recognized a narrow exception in cases when the employee has 
                                                            
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. at 356 (“[A]s the majority notes, ‘[i]t is entirely consistent for the statute to punish 
knowing violations more severely than those of which the corporation was unaware.’”  (alteration 
in original)). 
 143. See Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States, 728 F.3d 1348, 1367–70 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 167 (2014) (“The difference between [subsection(a)(1)] and 
[subsection (a)(2)] is the degree of knowledge that must be proven.  The former provision—which 
carries a higher penalty—applies if the person knowingly engages in prohibited conduct.  The latter 
provides for strict liability against a ‘person’ who engages in prohibited conduct.”). 
 144. 728 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 167 (2014). 
 145. Id. at 1368–69. 
 146. Id. at 1370 & n.25 
 147. Id. at 1368–70. 
 148. Id. at 1369–70 (citing Long Island Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States, 503 F.3d 1234, 1249–
50 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
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an adverse interest.149  The exception applies “when the agent’s conduct is 
‘entirely’ in the agent’s interest without even incidental benefit to the 
principal.”150  However, the court found that KBR did receive a benefit from the 
agent’s actions and, consequently, imputed his knowledge to the company.151 
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Newman did not believe that 
KBR received a benefit.152  Specifically, Judge Newman suggested that a clear 
benefit had to be shown to hold KBR vicariously liable under subsection (a)(1) 
before elevating the violation from one that “invoke[s] only the single strict 
liability provision of [subsection] (a)(2).”153 
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit dismissed the argument that common law 
agency principles placed limits on vicarious liability when punitive damages 
were involved.154  The court found that “these limits do not apply to ‘the 
interpretation of special statutes’ like those giving ‘triple damages.’”155  
Moreover, the majority stated, without explanation, that “[t]he ‘special statute’ 
here, the AKA, with its double damage provision, does not involve punitive 
damages . . . [and] is [therefore] outside the scope of . . . the Restatement’s 
heightened standard for vicarious liability.”156 
E.  Impact of Imputing Liability to Employers Under Subsection (a)(1) 
The consequences of the Fifth’s Circuit Vavra decision will depend on how 
the district court, on remand, applies the knowledge standard to a violation under 
subsection (a)(1).157  The broad standard endorsed by the Fifth Circuit that 
imputes knowledge of lower-level employees with apparent authority to the 
corporation could have a significant impact on the way corporations specify and 
police internal anti-kickback practices; regardless of the result, Vavra could 
cause an increase in litigation.158  The fact-intensive question of when 
                                                            
 149. Id. at 1369–70. 
 150. Id. at 1369.  See also Grassmueck v. Am. Shorthorn Ass’n, 402 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 
2005) (“The refusal to impute knowledge to the principal of an agent who is acting adversely to the 
principal is an acknowledgment that the usual legal fiction of complete agent-principal 
communication is unjustified where the agent is acting adversely.” (citing Martin Marietta Corp. v. 
Gould, Inc., 70 F.3d 768, 773 (4th Cir. 1995)); In re Scott Acquisition Corp. 364 B.R. 562, 568 
(Bankr. D. Del 2007) (“Th[e] [adverse interest] exception is only applicable when the agent is 
acting entirely adverse to the principal, and the principal is in no way benefitting from the agent’s 
actions.” (citing Beck v. Deloitte & Touche, Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, Ernest & Young, L.L.P., 
144 F.3d 732, 736 (11th Cir. 1998))). 
 151. Id. at 1372. 
 152. Id. at 1373 (Newman, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 153. Id. at 1374. 
 154. Id. at 1370 (majority opinion). 
 155. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 6 § 217 C, cmt. c (1958)). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Pachter, supra note 79. 
 158. See United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 353 n.14 
(5th Cir. 2013) (noting that the lower court, on remand, must consider that “[u]nder that standard . 
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knowledge may be imputed will increase litigation costs and risks, which, in 
turn, could promote more early settlements, even in cases where, on the merits, 
the contractor is not vicariously liable.159  Moreover, contractors could face an 
increased risk of debarment160 if it is found that the contractor took inadequate 
corporate measures to detect and prevent kickbacks.161 
Therefore, employers must closely monitor the actions of their employees to 
deter, detect, and stop kickback activity in its infancy.162  The Vavra decision 
will impose “pressure on compliance and ethics . . . programs,” and result in a 
“nearly impossible risk management environment,” especially given the absence 
of a requirement that an employer authorize an employee’s conduct outside the 
scope of his or her employment, or have any knowledge of it.163  One observer 
                                                            
. . KBR cannot be exposed to an unexpected flood of liability for nefarious acts of any and every 
member of its worldwide workforce”); Burgett, supra note 10, at 4 (discussing the impact of the 
court’s decision).  But see Pachter, supra note 79 (“[T]he Court’s assurance against the floodgate 
[of litigation] seems hardly sufficient to calm the fears of corporate risk-assessment specialists.”). 
 159. Burgett, supra note 10, at 4 (“Because the questions of knowledge and attribution of 
knowledge are highly fact-intensive, they are likely to survive dispositive pretrial motions.  This 
increases litigation expense and litigation risk for the defendant corporation, and thereby may tend 
to increase the likelihood and amount of settlements . . . .”). 
 160. “‘Debarment’ means action taken by [an agency head or designee] to exclude a contractor 
from government contracting and government approved subcontracting for a reasonable, specified 
period.”  FELDMAN & KEYES, supra note 34, at 159. 
 161. See John S. Pachter, 2 KBR Cases Illuminate Kickback Risks For Contractors, LAW360 
(Dec. 3, 2013, 8:04 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/491501/2-kbr-cases-illuminate-
kickback-risks-for-contractors. 
 162. Pachter, supra note 79 (advocating ethics and compliance programs, warning not to 
engage in kickbacks, and describing penalties of immediate dismissal).  In the wake of the Vavra 
decision, government contractors may be compelled to become better versed in the Anti-Kickback 
Act to ensure that their employees do not bring harm to the company through their own self-dealing.  
Through training and compliance programs, the constant monitoring of employees actions, and 
prompt investigations, companies will best be able to protect themselves from facing increased 
situations of vicarious liability under the Anti-Kickback Act.  Stephen R. Spivack et al., Fifth 
Circuit’s Ruling On Anti-Kickback Act May Generate More Lawsuits Against Federal Contractors, 
BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP (July 26, 2013), http://www.babc.com/fifth-circuits-
ruling-on-anti-kickback-act-may-generate-more-lawsuits-against-federal-contractors-07-26-
2013/. 
The KBR decision charges corporate entities with the difficult task of monitoring third-
party views of employees’ ‘apparent authority’ or face potential liability for those 
employees’ actions.  To limit this risk, government contractors and other corporate 
entities should evaluate their current compliance and oversight measures to ensure that 
they are adequate. 
The Fifth Circuit Weighs in on Vicarious Liability Under the Anti-Kickback Act, ROPES & GRAY 3 
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/alerts/2013/10/20131022_FCA_Alert. 
pdf. 
 163. Gregory A. Brower & Brett W. Johnson, When Enough Is Not Enough: Two Court Rulings 
Complicate Corporate Compliance Efforts, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 11, 2013, at 2, available 
at http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/10-11-13BrowerJohnson_LB.pdf. 
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asserted that there is “no amount of hiring screening, training, auditing, or 
internal control [that] can adequately control [this] risk.”164 
IV.  RESOLVING VAVRA’S SHORTFALLS: REQUIRING AN INTENT TO BENEFIT 
The Fifth Circuit interpreted the Anti-Kickback Act to make employers 
vicariously liable simply because the employee was cloaked with apparent 
authority.165  This kind of liability was already clearly contemplated under 
subsection (a)(2), but not under subsection (a)(1).166  The Vavra court’s decision 
renders it unnecessary for the employee to act with intent to benefit the employer 
in order for vicarious liability to apply.167  The court declining to limit damages 
for vicarious liability is applied,168 held that damages under the Anti-Kickback 
Act are different from punitive damages under the FCA and distinguished the 
case from the Fifth Circuit’s previous decision in Ridglea.169 
A.  The Fifth Circuit Questionably Declined to Extend Ridglea’s Holding to 
Vavra 
By holding that damages under the AKA are compensatory rather than 
punitive, the Fifth Circuit declined to apply the “act-to-benefit” standard it had 
previously endorsed in Ridglea.170  Specifically, the Fifth Circuit distinguished 
a civil action under the AKA to recover actual losses caused by an employee 
from an FCA action designed to recover forfeitures and apply “double damages 
far in excess of the actual loss.”171 
The court’s view of damages as solely compensatory does not square with 
other courts’ interpretations, which have designated the damages under 
subsection (a)(1) as punitive.172  While there is no consensus among 
jurisdictions, the double damages of the “knowing” violation under subsection 
                                                            
 164. Id. at 2–3. 
 165. United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 352 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
 166. See id. at 348 (discussing the district court’s interpretation of the statute). 
 167. See id. at 353.  
 168. Id. at 352–53. 
 169. Id. at 350–51. 
 170. Id. at 353. 
 171. Id. at 350 (citing United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966), 
superseded by statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012)). 
 172. See, e.g., United States v. Kruse, 101 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“At least part 
of the purpose of the Anti–Kickback statute, then, is punitive, and the [c]ourt must continue its 
inquiry by determining whether the penalties set by the statute are grossly disproportionate to the 
offenses the statute proscribes.”); Morse Diesel Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 116, 118 n.3 
(2005) (“As discussed further herein, since the Anti–Kickback Act is both remedial and punitive, 
the court’s determination was made under a clear and convincing standard rather than the 
preponderance of evidence standard typically utilized in civil cases.”); but see United States v. 
Lippert, 148 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he penalty in [subsection (a)(1)(A)] of twice the 
amount of each kickback is primarily remedial in purpose and not punitive in effect.”). 
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(a)(1) appear to be designed to punish what the drafters of the Act viewed as 
more egregious behavior—a motive akin to the idea behind punitive damages.173  
In other cases of vicarious liability involving punitive damages, the Supreme 
Court has stated that for knowledge to be imputed, the employee should be 
“‘important,’ but perhaps need not be the employer’s ‘top management, officers, 
or directors,’ . . . acting ‘in a managerial capacity.’”174  If the Fifth Circuit had 
properly determined that the Act provided for punitive damages, then it would 
not have followed that the knowledge of any low-level agent with apparent 
authority could be imputed to the corporation.  Because the damages under the 
AKA are, at the very least, quasi-punitive, the Fifth Circuit should have held, 
like in Ridglea, that the agent must be in an “important” position to the company, 
or that he or she at least acted to benefit the company before the employer could 
be found vicariously liable. 
To further justify its refusal to extend Ridglea, the Fifth Circuit questionably 
relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in ASME.175  ASME involved an antitrust 
violation in which an agent, cloaked with apparent authority, defrauded a third 
party.176  The agent, an employee of Hydrolevel’s competitor, McDonnell & 
Miller (M&M), wrote a letter to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
(ASME) on letterhead containing his employer’s vice president’s name, 
prompting a public inquiry into the effectiveness of Hydrolevel’s boiler 
product.177  As a result of the agent’s showing of apparent authority, “Hydrolevel 
. . . suffer[ed] from market resistance.”178 
The actions in ASME differ significantly from violations of the AKA.  In 
ASME, M&M’s agent, acting with apparent authority, used his position in the 
company to deceive the ASME into questioning Hydrolevel, a competing 
company.179  Unlike in ASME, in which the ASME was unaware of the fraud of 
M&M’s apparent agent and Hydrolevel was harmed by his actions, the 
subcontractor involved in an AKA violation is typically not harmed.180  Rather, 
the subcontractor is arguably in a better position because it should be in line to 
receive preferential treatment.  The real victim is the prime contractor whose 
                                                            
 173. See supra note 172; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 474 (10th ed. 2009) (defining punitive 
damages). 
 174. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 543 (1999). 
 175. See United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 350–52 
(5th Cir. 2013). 
 176. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. (ASME), 456 U.S. 556, 558–59 
(1982). 
 177. Id. at 561–62. 
 178. Id. at 563. 
 179. Id. at 577. 
 180. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (describing common violations of the 
AKA). 
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agent accepted kickbacks and opened the prime contractor to liability under the 
AKA.181 
In general, a subcontractor is not concerned with the authority of the agent 
who accepts the offered kickback.182  There is not an AKA violation when the 
authority of the agent is used as leverage to fool a subcontractor and, thus, as 
Judge Jolly stated, apparent authority has no place in the discussion of when to 
impute knowledge to the employer.183  Because the employer is the potential 
victim, it is more appropriate for the court to look at whether or not the agent 
acted to benefit the principal, instead of whether the agent had apparent 
authority, before deciding to impute knowledge to the employer and hold them 
accountable through vicarious liability. 
To prevent the employer from being unfairly punished for the self-dealing of 
its employees without its knowledge, the Fifth Circuit should have extended 
Ridglea’s “act-to-benefit” standard.  Without any such requirement, violations 
of the AKA, when the agent had apparent authority, could increase vicarious 
liability litigation.184 
B.  The Fifth Circuit’s Decision Does Not Comport with Other Federal 
Statutes’ Scienter Requirements 
In Vavra, the Fifth Circuit viewed AKA’s subsection (a)(1) as an action 
grounded in tort law rather than a form of contract fraud.185  Statutes similar to 
the AKA, such as the FCA and AKS, punish conduct similar to that punished 
under the AKA, but do so in terms of contract fraud.186  Despite this notable 
difference, the AKA and FCA are often litigated together, as was the case in 
Vavra.187  The Fifth Circuit’s failure to view the AKA in the same light as these 
other statutes has led to an inconsistent and confusing interpretation of the 
scienter in subsection (a)(1) that requires no actual showing of employer 
knowledge. 
                                                            
 181. See Schulenberger, supra note 12, at 558 (explaining that the AKA prohibits payments to 
agents of prime contractors). 
 182. See Pachter, supra note 161. 
 183. United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 355 (5th Cir. 
2013) (Jolly, J., concurring). 
 184. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Vavra, 727 F.3d at 348 (acknowledging the presumption that Congress intended to 
incorporate ordinary vicarious liability rules when it creates tort actions). 
 186. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 19 F.3d 770, 776 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining 
the FCA’s application to “contracts that are tainted by kickbacks”). 
 187. United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 473, 479 
(E.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013).  See also United States v. Lippert, 148 F.3d 
974, 977 (8th Cir.1998) (explaining that the government filed an action seeking penalties under the 
AKA and the FCA); Gen. Dynamics Corp., 19 F.3d at 777 (holding that “the AKA does not preempt 
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v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 116, 117 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (stating that the government brought 
counterclaims under the AKA, the FCA, and the Contract Disputes Act among others). 
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Because knowledge is not defined in the AKA, this issue may be resolved by 
adopting a definition similar to that in the FCA, given that the statutes have a 
common objective.  The FCA defines “knowingly” as actual knowledge, 
deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard.188  Deliberate ignorance, a form of 
willful misconduct, arises when one purposefully refuses to acknowledge the 
existence of illegal activity.189  Reckless disregard presents a slightly more 
lenient standard, addressing grossly negligent conduct, that is not necessarily 
intentional, in situations where violations were so apparent that they should have 
been known.190 
The FCA requires, minimally, a showing of reckless disregard before 
imputing knowledge, and the AKA should be no different.  The Fifth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the AKA makes knowledge of the corporation a foregone 
conclusion through its apparent authority analysis.191  By imposing vicarious 
liability for “knowing” violations of employees with apparent authority, a 
standard so low that almost every interaction between an agent and 
subcontractor could be imputable, without any showing of knowledge on part of 
the employer, the court wrote the scienter out of subsection (a)(1).  As it stands, 
“knowingly” under subsection (a)(1) requires no greater showing of culpability 
than the strict liability standard set forth in subsection (a)(2). 
The Vavra decision has rendered subsection (a)(2) superfluous, 
accomplishing what the district court sought to prevent.192  The conduct 
constituting a strict liability violation under subsection (a)(2) is now all that is 
necessary to establish vicarious liability under (a)(1).  The government has no 
need to bring a subsection (a)(2) claim against the employer, when a subsection 
(a)(1) violation yields twice the damages.  A showing of at least gross negligence 
or reckless disregard, as is required under the FCA in place of actual knowledge, 
should be required to distinguish the two subsections of the AKA. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Circuit confusingly determined that the same unwitting behavior of 
an employer that is strictly punished under subsection (a)(2), regardless of the 
employee’s intent, will be punished as more egregious behavior under 
subsection (a)(1).  If employers are likely to be found vicariously liable under 
subsection (a)(1) for violations unknown to them, government contractors will 
be forced to take additional precautions to prevent AKA violations.  Employers 
will likely need to institute extensive new controls to ensure that employees are 
not engaging in conduct that is detrimental to the employer.  Such controls are 
                                                            
 188. See supra note 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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538 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:515 
both costly and far from foolproof.  The costs will ultimately be passed on to the 
taxpayers because they are allowable costs under government contracts. 
The Vavra decision should either be reviewed by the Supreme Court or used 
as the catalyst for appropriate legislative changes to the AKA.  The Fifth Circuit 
has blurred the distinction between subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), opening the 
door for innocent employer conduct to constitute a knowing violation of the 
AKA.  The court exceeded the proper limits of judicial interpretation by 
determining that an employee’s apparent authority is sufficient to impute 
knowledge to create vicarious liability under subsection (a)(1).  Even if no 
showing of knowledge on the employer’s part is required, intent of the employee 
to benefit the employer should be the minimal standard required to attribute 
liability to the company under subsection (a)(1).  A showing of gross negligence 
or reckless disregard by the employer to learn the employee’s actions would be 
even more appropriate.  Without such a limitation, the court may have opened 
the door for increased litigation under subsection (a)(1), which raises costs to 
government contractors, and, ultimately, harms the procurement process with 
the statute that Congress intended to protect it, the Anti-Kickback Act. 
 
 
 
